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INTRODUCTION

Most automobile liability insurance policies require the insured to cooperate
with the insurer by notifying the insurer of a lawsuit in a timely manner, and
stipulate that a failure to do so constitutes a breach of the policy.' In South
Carolina, while this type of breach may affect the insurer's obligation to the
insured, 2 it will not relieve the insurer of its obligation to honor the policy with
respect to third-party victims of the insured, at least in cases where a statute
mandates that the insured carry the liability policy for the protection of the
general public. 3 Thus, even where a liability insurer does not learn about a
victim's lawsuit against its insured until after a default judgment against the
insured has been issued, the insurer may nevertheless be obligated to pay on the
judgment in accordance with the policy.
In such a case, however, Rule 60(b) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure may allow the insurer to have the default judgment set
4 aside so that it
has a chance to defend the re-opened action on the merits. In considering
motions to vacate under Rule 60(b), South Carolina courts must consider the

1.
14 LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 199:37 (3d ed.
2005).
2.
The South Carolina Code provides that an insured's failure to forward pleadings to its
liability insurer will not "in any way relieve the insurer of its obligations to the insured" if the
insurer has "actual notice" from some other source of the service of a complaint on the insured.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-142 (2002). This provision implies that an insurer who lacks actual notice
may use the insured's failure to notify the insurer as a defense against the insured. See id.
3.
See Cowan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 357 S.C. 625, 627-29, 594 S.E.2d 275, 276-77 (2004)
(holding that S.C. Code section 38-77-142(B) does not affect an insurer's obligation to a third-party
victim, even if the insurer receives no notice of the victim's lawsuit until after a default judgment
issues against the insured); Shores v. Weaver, 315 S.C. 347, 356, 433 S.E.2d 913, 917 (Ct. App.
1993) (holding that an automobile liability insurer whose policy provides statutory minimum
coverage remains liable under its policy to a third-party victim of the insured's negligence despite
the insured's failure to notify the insurer of the victim's lawsuit).
4.
See S.C. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
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following factors: (1) promptness of the motion to vacate; (2) reasons for the
default judgment; and (3) prejudice to other parties if the default judgment is
vacated.5 In addition, the movant must present evidence of a meritorious defense
in order to prevail on the motion.6 Reasons for relief from default may include
"surprise, or excusable neglect" under Rule 60(b)(1), or "fraud,
7
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party" under 60(b)(3).
The latter grounds may apply where plaintiffs counsel begins negotiations with
the insurer, files suit against the insured without notifying the insurer, and
continues communications with the insurer as if no suit has been filed.
The "meritorious defense" requirement prevents courts from engaging in
futile actions; 9 it would be inefficient for a court to vacate a judgment against a
defendant and allow a proceeding on the merits when the defendant has no
evidence to support a defense. The South Carolina Supreme Court has held that
"[a] meritorious defense need not be perfect ....It need be only one which is
worthy of a hearing or judicial inquiry because it raises a question of law ...or10 a
real controversy as to real facts arising from conflicting or doubtful evidence."
A recent South Carolina Supreme Court case, McClurg v. Deaton,"1 raises
issues under the meritorious defense requirement in the context of a liability
insurer whose federally-mandated endorsement made it liable to cover an
$800,000 default judgment. 12 The judgment stemmed from an accident
involving a vehicle owned by the insured trucking company and being driven by
the insured's then employee. 13 The plaintiffs named only the driver, who b
then had left the company and moved away from South Carolina, as defendant.
Plaintiffs' counsel had discussed the claim with insurer's counsel, and plaintiffs'
counsel's course of conduct suggested that he would notify insurer's counsel if a
suit were filed. 15 However, after filing suit against the driver, plaintiffs' counsel
continued negotiations with insurer's counsel as if no lawsuit had commenced. 16

5.

N.H. Ins. Co. v. Bey Corp., 312 S.C. 47, 50, 435 S.E.2d 377, 379 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing
SOUTH CAROLINA CIVIL PROCEDURE 82

HARRY M. LIGHTSEY, JR. & JAMES F. FLANAGAN,

(1985)).
6.
Thompson v. Hammond, 299 S.C. 116, 119, 382 S.E.2d 900, 903 (1989) (citing
LIGHTSEY & FLANAGAN, supra note 5, at 492).

7.

See S.C. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), (3).

8.
See McClurg v. Deaton, 380 S.C. 563, 573, 671 S.E.2d 87, 92-93 (Ct. App. 2008), affd,
395 S.C. 85, 716 S.E.2d 887 (2011).
9.
See Thompson, 299 S.C. at 119-20, 382 S.E.2d at 903 (citing LIGHTSEY & FLANAGAN,
supra note 5, at 402).
10. Id. at 120, 382 S.E.2d at 903 (quoting Graham v. Town of Loris, 272 S.C. 442, 453, 284

S.E.2d 594, 599 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
11. 395 S.C. 85, 716 S.E.2d 887 (2011).
12. See id. at 89-90, 716 S.E.2d at 889-90 (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 89, 716 S.E.2d at 889.
14. McClurg v. Deaton, 380 S.C. 563, 567-68, 671 S.E.2d 87, 89-90 (Ct. App. 2008), affd,
395 S.C. 85, 716 S.E.2d 887 (2011).
15. See McClurg, 395 S.C. at 89-90, 716 S.E.2d at 889 (Toal, C.J., dissenting).

16. Id. at 90, 716 S.E.2d at 889.
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When insurer's counsel finally learned of the lawsuit against the driver, a default
judgment had already been issued against the driver, 7 and, under a federallymandated endorsement, the insurer was obligated to honor its policy with respect
to that judgment.' 8 Unsurprisingly, the insurer attempted to have the default
judgment set aside under Rule 60(b). 19
The South Carolina Supreme Court, affirming in whole the decision of the
court of appeals, held that the conduct of plaintiffs' counsel led to the type of
"surprise" contemplated by Rule 60(b)(1),2 but that the insurer had presented no
evidence of a meritorious defense and was, thus, not entitled to have the default
judgment set aside under Rule 60.21 An affidavit in the record indicated that the
plaintiffs had, at one point, offered to settle the case for $170,000, much less
than the $800,000 default judgment they eventually received.22 On appeal, the
insurer pointed to this affidavit as evidence of a meritorious defense relating to
the amount of damages at issue in the case, 23 but the court of appeals and
supreme court rejected the argument, holding that the insurer did not make this
argument to the trial court and had, thus, failed to preserve the issue for appeal. 24
As a result, neither court had occasion to consider whether a defense related only
to the amount of damages, as opposed to liability, could constitute a meritorious
defense for purposes of Rule 60(b).
This Note will address this question left open by the court in McClurg. Part
II recounts the court of appeals and supreme court opinions, with an emphasis on
the meritorious defense issue. Part III, then, reviews decisions from other
jurisdictions, addressing whether a defense related only to damages may serve as
a meritorious defense sufficient to support setting aside a default judgment under
Rule 60. Part IV makes a recommendation to South Carolina courts should this
issue arise squarely in the future, and identifies some germane considerations
that remain open on this issue.
I.

MCCLURG V. DEATON

Ann McClurg was injured in August of 2002 when the car she was riding in
collided with a truck driven by Harrell Deaton in the course of his employment
25
Prime's
insurer,
trucking
Prime,
Inc., of
an interstate
with
Newwas
a letter
of
right company.
away and New
received
notified
the accident
Zurich,

17. Id. at 90-91, 716 S.E.2d at 890.
18. See McClurg, 380 S.C. at 570, 671 S.E.2d at 91; infra text accompanying notes 35-38.
19. McClurg, 395 S.C. at 91, 716 S.E.2d at 890 (Toal, C.J., dissenting) (citing S.C. R. Civ. P.

60(b)).
20. See id. at 91, 716 S.E.2d at 890 (citing McClurg, 380 S.C. at 573, 671 S.E.2d at 92).

21.

See id. at 87, 716 S.E.2d at 887-88 (majority opinion).

22. Id. at 95, 716 S.E.2d at 892 (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
23. McClurg, 380 S.C. at 575, 671 S.E.2d at 94.
24. Id. at 576, 671 S.E.2d at 94; McClurg, 395 S.C. at 87, 716 S.E.2d at 888 (majority

opinion).
25. See McClurg, 380 S.C. at 567, 671 S.E.2d at 89.
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representation from the McClurgs' counsel in September. 26 Settlement
negotiations ensued. 27 Meanwhile, Deaton left his job with New Prime and
moved to Texas. 28 In June of 2004, Zurich received a letter from the plaintiffs'
counsel stating that, if he did not hear from Zurich by the end of the week
regarding a $170,000 settlement offer, he "[would] file suit and... send [Zurich]
a courtesy copy of the pleadings. ' 29 The suit was not filed at that time, and, in
October 2004, counsel again demanded settlement by letter and included a copy
of a complaint that listed New Prime as a defendant. 0 Unbeknownst to Zurich
and New Prime, the McClurgs filed suit solely against Deaton in April of 2005." 1
Deaton never notified New Prime or Zurich of the lawsuit. 32 In May of 2005,
plaintiffs' counsel sent Zurich copies of new medical records, but never made
any mention of the pending lawsuit. 33 Apparently, Zurich did not discover the
lawsuit until it received a copy of the $800,000 default judgment in October of
2005.34
New Prime was in a unique position in this case because of "a federally 5
mandated MCS-90 Endorsement contained in the applicable insurance policy."
The endorsement was required to be included in every liability insurance policy
covering a motor carrier, and it holds the insurance company liable for "any final
judgment recovered against the insured for public liability resulting from
negligence in the operation, maintenance or use of motor vehicles" used in the
36
The law further states that "no
course of the motor carrier's business.
condition, provision, stipulation, or limitation contained in the policy, this
endorsement, or any other endorsement thereon, or violation thereof, shall
37
relieve the company from liability or from the payment of any final judgment.,
Thus, the MCS-90 endorsement "assure[s] that injured members of the public are
able to obtain judgment from negligent authorized interstate carriers" by making
the insurance company primarily liable. 38 Because Deaton was acting in the

26. Id.
27. Id. at 567-68, 671 S.E.2d at 89-90.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 567, 671 S.E.2d at 89-90 (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. Id. at 567, 671 S.E.2d at 90.
31. Id. at 568, 671 S.E.2d at 90.
32. See id.at 569, 671 S.E.2d at 90.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 570, 671 S.E.2d at 91.
36. 49 C.F.R. § 387.15, at illus. 1 (2011).
37. Id.
38. Canal Ins. Co. v. Distrib. Servs., Inc., 320 F.3d 488, 490 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting John
Deere Ins. Co. v. Nueva, 229 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This endorsement does not alter the contract between the insured and the insurer; the insured is
obligated to repay the insurer for any payment the insurer would not have been obligated to pay in
the absence of the MCS-90 provision. 49 C.F.R. § 387.15, at illus. I. Further, the majority rule is
that this provision has no effect on determining which insurer is primarily responsible for a
judgment rendered against a common insured. Canal, 320 F.3d at 492 (citations omitted).
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course of his employment with New Prime when he was involved in the
39
accident, the judgment in this case fell under the scope of the endorsement.
Zurich, as New Prime's insurance carrier, was, therefore, liable
for the judgment;
4
it was irrelevant that New Prime was not a named defendant. 0
New Prime, recognizing this potential liability, moved to intervene in the
McClurgs' action against Deaton in order to file a motion to set aside the default
judgment and reopen the matter on the merits. 4' The trial judge allowed New
Prime to intervene in the action because he recognized "New Prime's large
financial interest in the action," but he denied the Rule 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(3)
motion on the grounds that New Prime had not been a party to the action when
the McClurgs had commenced it and, therefore, had no right to receive notice of
42 The court of appeals affirmed
the action at that
the denial of New
,43 time.
Prime's motion, but on different grounds.
Specifically, the court of appeals
held that New Prime became a party to the action when it successfully
intervened 44 and noted that "the facts show New Prime was taken by surprise
when counsel filed the action solely against Deaton and failed to inform Zurich
or New Prime of this action, thereby meeting the surprise or excusable neglect
requirement under Rule 60(b)(1)."45 The court found that the plaintiffs'
counsel's conduct made it reasonable for Zurich and New Prime to believe that
they would be included in, or at least notified of, any lawsuit arising from
Deaton's accident. 46 The court noted further that counsel's failure to mention
the suit to Zurich may have even satisfied the misrepresentation and misconduct
elements of Rule 60(b)(3).47
However, the court of appeals affirmed the denial of New Prime's Rule 60
motion, holding that New Prime had failed to present any evidence of a
meritorious defense and, in any case, failed to preserve the issue for review. 48
New Prime had not specifically addressed the meritorious defense requirement in
its Rule 60 motion, nor had it specifically addressed the issue in a motion for

39. See McClurg, 380 S.C. at 567, 671 S.E.2d at 89.
40. See id. at 570-71, 671 S.E.2d at 91.
41. Id. at 569, 671 S.E.2d at 90. Deaton also made a Rule 60 motion, but his arguments are
outside the scope of this Note. See id.
42. Id. at 570-71, 671 S.E.2d at 91.
43. See id. at 571, 576, 671 S.E.2d at 91, 94.
44. See id. at 571, 671 S.E.2d at 91-92.
45. Id. at 573, 671 S.E.2d at 92.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 573, 671 S.E.2d at 92-93. The court indicated that the attorney's conduct raised
"serious concerns." Id. at 573, 671 S.E.2d at 93. The supreme court also declined to decide
whether Rule 60(b)(3) was satisfied. McClurg v. Deaton, 395 S.C. 85, 87, 716 S.E.2d 887, 888
(2011). However, Justice Toal, dissenting, declared that the misconduct element of Rule 60(b)(3)
was "undoubtedly met." Id. at 98, 716 S.E.2d at 894. Additionally, because the MCS-90
endorsement is federally mandated, plaintiffs' counsel was likely aware that Zurich would be liable
for a judgment entered solely against Deaton.
48. McClurg, 380 S.C. at 576, 671 S.E.2d at 94.
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reconsideration to the trial court. 49 In its reply brief to the supreme court, New
Prime argued that the discrepancy between the McClurgs' $170,000 settlement
offer and the $800,000 default judgment was in the record and indicated that
New Prime had a meritorious defense as to damages. The court of appeals did
not dispute these facts, but made the distinction between simply having facts in
the record and raising an argument based on these facts for the trial court to rule
on, noting that "[n]owhere in the record is there any indication that New Prime
raised this [discrepancy] to the [trial] court as an argument that a meritorious
defense existed." 5 As a result, the court of appeals held that, even if "this bare
assertion regarding settlement negotiations is evidence of a defense... [,] the
argument is not preserved for our review., 52 New Prime argued that this
distinction misapplied existing law on raising a meritorious defense. 53
The supreme court affirmed in whole the court of appeals's opinion.54 Thus,
the supreme court held that this issue was not preserved for appeal because it
was never presented to or ruled on by the circuit court.55 Justice Pleicones,
writing for the majority, stated that "[iut is axiomatic that an issue cannot be
raised for the first time in a reply brief., 56 According to the majority, to say that
the meritorious defense issue had been "fairly and properly raised ' 7 to the trial
court would "strain[] credulity" and burden trial courts with "discerning the
issues a arty should raise, and perusing the record for evidence to support those
issues."
Justice Pleicones stated further that the burden to develop the evidentiary
record was on New Prime: "[I]t is well-settled that the moving party in a Rule
59
60(b) motion has the burden of presenting evidence entitling him to relief."
Even if the meritorious defense issue was raised by the memorandum to the trial
court, "neither petitioner could be said to have presented evidence
of such a
6
defense as it is beyond cavil that a settlement offer is not evidence."

49. See id. at 575-76, 671 S.E.2d at 94.
50. Reply Brief of Petitioner New Prime, Inc. at 10, McClurg v. Deaton, 395 S.C. 85, 716
S.E.2d 887 (2011) (No. 27038) [hereinafter Reply Brief]. New Prime submitted an affidavit from a
Zurich employee that alleged the McClurgs made a settlement demand of $170,000 during
negotiations. See McClurg, 395 S.C. at 86 n.1, 716 S.E.2d at 887 n.1.
51. McClurg, 380 S.C. at 576, 671 S.E.2d at 94.
52. Id. at 576, 671 S.E.2d at 94.
53. Reply Brief, supra note 50, at 8-9.
54. McClurg, 395 S.C. at 87, 716 S.E,2d at 888.
55. Id. at 86-87, 716 S.E.2d at 887-88.
56. Id. at 87 n.2, 716 S.E.2d at 888 n.2 (citing Chet Adams Co. v. James F. Pedersen Co., 307
S.C. 33, 37, 413 S.E.2d 827, 829 (1992)).
57. Id. at 86 n.1, 716 S.E.2d at 887 n.1 (quoting JEAN HOEFER TOAL ET AL., APPELLATE
PRACTICE INSOUTH CAROLINA 65 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

58. Id. at 86 n.1,716 S.E.2d at 887 n.l.
59. Id. (citing BB&T v. Taylor, 369 S.C. 548, 552, 633 S.E.2d 501, 503 (2006)).
60. Id. (citing S.C. R. EVID. 408; Fesmire v. Digh, 385 S.C. 296, 309, 683 S.E.2d 803, 810
(Ct. App. 2009)).
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Then Chief Judge Hearn 61 and Chief Justice Toal both sharply dissented
from the majority opinions of their respective courts. 62 Each of them found that
63
the meritorious defense issue had been raised and ruled on by the trial court.
Chief Judge Hearn found that the McClurgs' counsel's settlement demand was
raised as a meritorious defense in the circuit court because that court held that no
meritorious defense had been shown; she therefore concluded that64the "argument
was raised and ruled upon, and is thus properly before this court."
Chief Justice Toal agreed with Judge Hearn' s opinion that the novel question
of whether a defense only as to damages would be recognized in South Carolina
65
was placed "squarely before the court of appeals" by the trial judge's holding.
She also found that "the Court need not look beyond the pleadings to find the
meritorious defense raised by Petitioners." 66 In explanation, Chief Justice Toal
stated that South Carolina courts "have not required that parties specifically tag
their argument as a 'meritorious defense' in a Rule 60(b) motion. 67 She cited
prior cases where aPpellate courts found a meritorious defense based upon
evidence in the record and declared that "the standard for finding a party raised
a meritorious defense is a low one.'69 Justice Toal concluded that "the majority
is apparently expounding the view that a party must use the magic words,
'meritorious defense,' when arguing that a court may have reached a different
result had it heard a case on the merits.70 As elaborated, our courts have never
before required such explicit language."

61. Justice Hearn, former Chief Judge of the South Carolina Court of Appeals, recused
herself from the case when it came before the supreme court, and Acting Justice John H. Waller
voted with the majority in her stead. See id. at 88, 716 S.E.2d at 889.
62. Id. (Toal, C.J., dissenting); McClurg v. Deaton, 380 S.C. 563, 580, 671 S.E.2d 87, 96 (Ct.
concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff'd, 395 S.C. 85, 716 S.E.2d 887
App. 2008) (Hearn, J.,
(2011).
63. McClurg, 395 S.C. at 89, 716 S.E.2d at 889 (Toal, C.J., dissenting); McClurg, 380 S.C. at
581-82, 671 S.E.2d at 97 (Heam, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64. McClurg, 380 S.C. at 581-82, 671 S.E.2d at 97 (Hearn, C.J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part). Justice Pleicones found that the trial judge made no such holding, concluding
that the trial judge's statement was just an observation. McClurg, 395 S.C. at 86 n.1, 716 S.E.2d at
887 n.I (majority opinion). Justice Pleicones went on to state that even if the judge's statement had
been a ruling, "the fact remains that he would have been correct." Id. (citing S.C. R. EvID. 408;
Fesmire, 385 S.C. at 309, 683 S.E.2d at 810).
65. McClurg, 395 S.C. at 89, 716 S.E.2d at 889 (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 93,716 S.E.2d at 891.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 93-94, 716 S.E.2d at 891-92 (citing Thompson v. Hammond, 299 S.C. 116, 120,
382 S.E.2d 900, 903 (1989); Williams v. Watkins, 384 S.C. 319, 326-27, 681 S.E.2d 914, 917-18
(Ct. App. 2009); Mictronics, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 345 S.C. 506, 511, 548 S.E.2d 223, 226
(Ct. App. 2001); EM-CO Metal Prods., Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 280 S.C. 107, 115, 311
S.E.2d 83, 88 (Ct. App. 1984)).
69. Id. at 94, 716 S.E.2d at 892 (citing Mictronics, 345 S.C. at 511, 548 S.E.2d at 226). This
finding is consistent with Chief Judge Hearn's assertion that "the law favors the resolution of
disputes based upon all parties having their day in court." McClurg, 380 S.C. at 580, 671 S.E.2d at
96 (Hearn, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70. McClurg, 395 S.C. at 96, 716 S.E.2d at 893 (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
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Both dissenting judges shared in the majorities' concern with the McClurgs'
counsel's conduct, and Chief Judge Hearn took time to elaborate further on the
severity of his actions. Chief Judge Heam found that the failure of the plaintiffs'
counsel to notify New Prime and Zurich of the pending lawsuit in these

circumstances "compromised] the high ethical standards attaching to the
practice of law."71 Chief Justice Toal agreed.72 Judge Hearn went on to say that

"[tihe maxim that a lawyer's word is his bond is not only a time-honored
tradition; it is included as a guiding principle in the South Carolina Bar's
Standards of Professionalism. '73 She indicated that "counsel's actions in
continuing to uphold the appearance of settlement negotiations while
simultaneously pursuing a default judgment without notice to Zurich, when
coupled with the evidence of a meritorious defense as to damages, certainly
warrants the grant of New Prime['s] ... Rule 60(b) motion., 74 Chief Justice
Toal called the plaintiffs' counsel's behavior "trickery and deception, '75 and
averred, "[a]lthough prolonging settlement negotiations in hopes of surpassing
the statute of limitations is a disdainful practice some insurance companies keep,
this in no way justifies the type of 'gotcha' game played by McClurgs' counsel
in this case." 6
Both dissents also stated that a defense only as to damages should be
recognized in South Carolina as a meritorious defense for purposes of Rule 60
motions. 77 Chief Justice Toal pointed out that "it was error for the trial court to
award Ann McClurg $600,000 in damages" for loss of in-kind services because
McClurg did not allege this loss in her complaint.78 She found that this error

71. McClurg, 380 S.C. at 582, 671 S.E.2d at 97 (Hearn, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
72. McClurg, 395 S.C. at 91, 716 S.E.2d at 890 (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
73. McClurg, 380 S.C. at 582, 671 S.E.2d at 97 (Hearn, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The same lawyer that represented Ann McClurg and her husband at trial and in
front of the court of appeals also appeared before the supreme court. See id. at 566, 671 S.E.2d at
89; McClurg, 395 S.C. at 86, 716 S.E.2d at 887. At oral argument in front of the supreme court,
counsel "admitted he was trying to fly under the radar in serving Deaton because of the prolonged,
and seemingly unsuccessful, settlement negotiations with Insurer." McClurg, 395 S.C. at 98, 716
S.E.2d at 894 (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
74. McClurg, 380 S.C. at 584, 671 S.E.2d at 98 (Hearn, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Judge Hearn dedicated a sizeable portion of her dissent to recounting McGee v.
Reynolds, 618 N.E.2d 40 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), an Indiana Court of Appeals case where the court
found "that the failure to serve the insurer after negotiations were undertaken, when combined with
the attorney's refusal to answer the direct inquiry by the insurance company as to the status of the
claim, constituted grounds for relief." McClurg, 380 S.C. at 583, 671 S.E.2d at 98 (citing McGee,
618 N.E.2d at 41).
75. McClurg, 395 S.C. at 89, 716 S.E.2d at 889 (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 98-99, 716 S.E.2d at 894.
77. See id. at 88-89, 716 S.E.2d at 889; McClurg, 380 S.C. at 581, 671 S.E.2d at 97 (Hearn,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
78. McClurg, 395 S.C. at 96, 716 S.E.2d at 893 (Toal, C.J., dissenting). Defendant Deaton
made this argument in his motion to reconsider; the court of appeals found that it had not been
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"represent[ed] a meritorious defense as it 'raise[d] a question of law deserving of
some investigation and discussion."' 79 Justice Toal recognized that "[i]t is in the
interest of judicial efficiency that our courts require a meritorious defense"80
the law."
because .'.[w]hatever doesn't make a difference doesn't matter' in
However, she concluded that this interest did not require a high standard for
showing a meritorious defense.8 t In fact, a high standard for this requirement
should be discouraged because "[r]estricting the scope of a meritorious defense
a party who may otherwise concede liability to
to liability alone incentivizes
' 82
wrongdoing.
deny any
Chief Judge Hearn pointed to several other jurisdictions that had previously
held that "an allegation that the amount of damages could be different from what
was awarded under the default judgment, is sufficient to satisfy the meritorious
defense requirement., 83 Because this issue was never reached by either
majority, 84 South Carolina courts will have to consider foreign jurisprudence if
this issue is squarely presented in the future.
III.

THE PRINCIPLES OF THE MERITORIOUS DEFENSE REQUIREMENT

Rules regarding the showing of a meritorious defense for purposes of setting
aside a default judgment require some flexibility. As commentators have stated:
By its very nature, the question whether to require a showing of a
meritorious defense, as well as the type of demonstration required, must
be determined on a case-by-case basis and with an awareness of the
policies behind default judgments and the circumstances under which
they should be set aside.

preserved for appeal. McClurg, 380 S.C. at 579-80, 671 S.E.2d at 96 (Hearn, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
79. McClurg, 395 S.C. at 96, 716 S.E.2d at 893 (Toal, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Thompson v.
Hammond, 299 S.C. 116, 120, 382 S.E.2d 900,903 (1989)).
80. Id. at 92, 716 S.E.2d at 891 (alteration in original) (quoting McCall v. Finley, 294 S.C. 1,
4, 362 S.E.2d 26,28 (Ct. App. 1987)).
81. See id. at 92-93, 716 S.E.2d at 891 (citing Thompson, 299 S.C. at 120, 382 S.E.2d at
903).
82. Id. at 97, 716 S.E.2d at 893.
83. McClurg, 380 S.C. at 581, 671 S.E.2d at 97 (Hearn, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
84. See McClurg, 395 S.C. at 87, 716 S.E.2d at 888 (majority opinion) ("The Court of
Appeals did not decide, nor do we, whether a meritorious defense as to damages alone and not as to
liability is an adequate basis for the grant of Rule 60 relief.").
85.

10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2697, at 163 (1998).
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In South Carolina, a defense must raise a question of law or controversy in
order to be meritorious. 86 For example, in Edwards v. Ferguson,87 counsel for
the insurer of the defendant in an automobile accident case made a "primafacie
showing of meritorious defenses" by claiming: "(1) that the defendant was not
driving the vehicle, and (2) that even if the defendant was driving the vehicle, the
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence and recklessness."88 These claims
were based on written statements from the defendant taken by the insurer's
counsel,89 and the South Carolina Supreme Court found that the trial court had
abused its discretion by not allowing the insurer relief from default judgment on
these bases. In Thompson v. Hammond,91 the defendants supplemented their
motion for relief from default judgment with "testimony showing that a real
92
controversy existed" as to whether the plaintiffs' claims were true and accurate.

The South Carolina Supreme Court
also found this presentation to meet the
93
requirement.
defense
meritorious
A survey of the law regarding meritorious defenses reveals that "there is no
universally accepted standard among courts as to what satisfies the requirement
that a party show a meritorious defense."9 However, even though standards
vary widely, the decisions regarding whether defenses only as to damages may
constitute a meritorious defense for the purpose of overturning a default
judgment are quite one sided. 95 The cases turn on what the defendant presents to

86. Thompson, 299 S.C. at 120, 382 S.E.2d at 903 (quoting Graham v. Town of Loris, 272
S.C. 442, 453, 248 S.E.2d 594, 599 (1978)).
87. 254 S.C. 278, 175 S.E.2d 224 (1970).
88. Id. at 282, 175 S.E.2d at 225.
89. Id. at 280-81, 175 S.E.2d at 225.
90. Id. at 283, 175 S.E.2d at 226.
91. 299 S.C. 116, 382 S.E.2d 900 (1989).
92. See id. at 120, 382 S.E.2d at 903.
93. Id.
94. WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 85, § 2697, at 160 (quoting Trueblood v. Grayson
Shops of Tenn., Inc., 32 F.R.D. 190, 196 (E.D. Va. 1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although judges and courts require that varying degrees of information be presented by defendants
in order to succeed on this motion, "[a] majority of the courts that have considered the question
have refused to accept general denials or conclusory statements that a defense exists; they have
insisted upon a presentation of some factual basis for the supposedly meritorious defense." Id.
(citations omitted). Some courts may "accept assertions of a defense advanced by motion or
affidavit," and some judges may even "look[] for some indication of a meritorious defense, even to
the extent of simply recognizing that the nature of the case was such that it suggested the possible
existence of a defense." Id. at 161-62 (citations omitted). In Moldwood Corp. v. Stutts, 410 F.2d
351 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam), the court required that the motion be accompanied by "a clear and
specific statement showing, not by conclusion, but by definite recitation of facts, that an injustice
has been probably done by the judgment." Id. at 352. Under any of these standards, defenses as to
damages only may stand, but what the defendant must demonstrate to the court in order to prove
that he is entitled to a hearing varies greatly.
95. See Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, Inc. v. Fodor Contracting Corp., 843 F.2d 808, 812 (4th
Cir. 1988); Cook v. Rowland, 49 P.3d 262, 266 (Alaska 2002); Hertz v. Berzanske, 704 P.2d 767,
773 (Alaska 1985), superseded on other grounds by statute, Act of 1986, ch. 139, 1986 Alaska
Laws 2 (amending certain Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure and providing an effective date), as
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show his defense, not what type of defense he is presenting. 96 As noted, the
analysis of determining whether a meritorious defense has been presented
incorporates considerable judicial discretion and the pertinent facts of each
case, which lends itself to subjective considerations rather than bright line rules
or strict guidelines. Still, most courts that have considered the issue have
the damages award granted by
reasoned that disputes as to the appropriateness of 98
default judgment should be resolved on the merits.

The Arizona Court of Appeals found that, even where there is no defense as
to liability, defenses disputing damages could be "substantial" and, therefore,
meritorious. 99 In Beal v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the

insurer did not raise any defense as to the negligence of the insured, but it
"disput[ed] the existence of [plaintiff's] physical injuries, which purportedly
arose from his mental distress."' ° The court found that this claim "adequately
alleged a substantial defense" and that the trial court had abused its discretion in
not allowing these issues to be litigated on the merits.' 0 ' The court also
articulated that "the amount of [plaintiff si medical expenses, $388, contrast[ed]
so sharply with the actual award of State Farm's $100,000 policy limits that this
discrepancy alone call[ed] into question the validity of the damage award.' ' l 0
In jurisdictions where a meritorious defense is roughly defined as one that
"if proved, would cause a different result upon a retrial of the case,"' 1 3 several
courts have determined that a change in the amount of the judgment constitutes a
"different result.' 4 Under this rule, "a defense is meritorious if it will 'reduce a
plaintiff' s award, and thereby alter the outcome of the suit,"' and the defendant
15
"need not provide a complete defense to the action" to meet his burden. 0

recognized in McConkey v. Hart, 930 P.2d 402 (Alaska 1996); Beal v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 729 P.2d 318, 325 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Oberkonz v. Gosha, No. 02AP-237, 2002 WL
31320242, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2002); Syphard v. Vrable, 751 N.E.2d 564, 567 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2001); Ferguson & Co. v. Roll, 776 S.W.2d 692, 699 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
96. See cases cited supra note 95.
97. WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 85, § 2697, at 162-63 (citations omitted).
98. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
99. Beal, 729 P.2d at 325.
100. Id. The insurer was granted relief from the default judgment, but the insured was not
because of a failure to show a valid reason for failing to diligently protect their interest when served
with the complaint. See id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Ferguson & Co. v. Roll, 776 S.W.2d 692, 698 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (citing The Moving
Co. v. Whitten, 717 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)).
104. Id. (citing Whitten, 717 S.W.2d at 120); see also Cook v. Rowland, 49 P.3d 262, 266
(Alaska 2002) (describing how Cook's amount of damages might be lower if he was allowed to
present his meritorious defense); Hertz v. Berzanske, 704 P.2d 767, 772 (Alaska 1985) (describing
how the court will look for a "different outcome" (internal quotation marks omitted)), superseded
on other grounds by statute, Act of 1986, ch. 139, 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws 2 (amending certain
Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure and providing an effective date), as recognized in McConkey v.
Hart, 930 P.2d 402 (Alaska 1996).
105. Cook, 49 P.3d at 266 (quoting Hertz, 704 P.2d at 772).
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In Cook v. Rowland, a case involving a wrongful death action, punitive
damages were awarded by default judgment in an amount three times that of the
actual damages, bringing the total judgment to over $7,000,000.106 The
defendant showed that the "damages awarded against him might be lower if he
were allowed to participate in a damages hearing," because punitive damages
may be assessed differently if he was given a chance to tell his story.10
Furthermore, the court concluded that testimony about his assets could also
"support a reduced ...award."' 108 Finally, the court commented that "a
controversy concerning damages of this magnitude should be resolved on its
merits whenever possible."'0
In Hertz v. Berzanske, the defendant met his burden of showing a
meritorious defense by presenting testimony that showed he could produce
evidence at trial of several acts on the part of the plaintiffs that would constitute
contributory negligence. 0 Because the case arose out of an automobile accident
and there was some evidence that the plaintiff was traveling in excess of the
speed limit, operating his motorcycle negligently, and driving the motorcycle
with a bald tire, the court held that a fact finder could conclude that the plaintiff
was "partly at fault and, therefore, not entitled to full recovery under the doctrine
of comparative negligence.""' Similarly, the Texas Court of Appeals has found
that affidavits tending to show that the amount of damages awarded by default
judgment "was a completely inaccurate figure," and required the court to set
aside the default judgment and allow the case to be tried on its merits.'2
In Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, Inc. v. Fodor Contracting Corp.,"1 the

defendants submitted affidavits in support of four defenses and counterclaims in
a construction case. 114 The court held that "[a]lthough these statements
address[ed] the amount, rather than the propriety, of Augusta's claim,... taken
together they [were] a sufficient proffer of a meritorious defense."" 5 The court
reasoned that "[t]he underlying concern is ...whether there is some possibility

that the outcome... after a full trial will be contrary to the result achieved by the
default."' 16 Further, this rule is favored in light' 7of the "admonition that any
doubts should be resolved in the movant's favor." "

106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 263.
Id. at 266.
Id.
Id. (quoting Hertz, 704 P.2d at 773) (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. Hertz, 704 P.2d at 772.
111. Id. (citing Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska 1975)).
112. Ferguson & Co. v. Roll, 776 S.W.2d 692, 699 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
113. 843 F.2d 808 (4th Cir. 1988).
114. Id. at 812.
115. Id.
116. Id. (omissions in original) (quoting WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 85) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
117. Id. (citing United States v. Moradi, 673 F.2d 725, 728 (4th Cir. 1982)).
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Other jurisdictions have found further justification for defenses only as to
damages. The Ohio Court of Appeals found that a defense as to damages must
be meritorious in the context of a Rule 60(b) motion because "a dispute
concerning the proper amount owed to the plaintiff directly affects the validity of
the judgment. ' 18 In Mazepa v. Krueger,t 19the court explained that "[glenerally,
an independent claim, even if it arises from the same transaction, will not
warrant granting relief from judgment."' 12 However, when "the counterclaim
indicates that the proper amount owed to [the plaintiff] is at issue," a counter
claim can be a meritorious defense. 121
In Oberkonz v. Gosha,122 the court of appeals declared that it was within the
trial court's discretion to award relief from default judgment where the defendant
claimed that she had a meritorious defense as to damages, but needed tog
through discovery in order to determine the extent of the plaintiffs' damages.
The defendant showed only that she had been pursuing medical records and
confirmation of lost wages since the suit was filed, and stated that the
motorcyclist she hit refused treatment and transportation to the emergency room
immediately following the accident. t24 The court also recognized the
inconsistency between the plaintiffs $300 in medical bills and the claimed 170
days of missed work. 125
In each of these cases, courts have recognized the importance of the damage

award being decided on the merits, whether the liability issue requires a trial or
not. Even though the courts were applying different standards and following
different precedents, their reasoning in these decisions has consistently embraced
defenses relating only to damages because such defenses make a real difference

118. Syphard v. Vrable, 751 N.E.2d 564, 567 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (citing Mazepa v.
Krueger, No. 70472, 1997 WL 1090422, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. May 15, 1997)).
119. No. 70472, 1997 WL 1090422 (Ohio Ct. App. May 15, 1997).
120. Id. at *2 (citing Urbana Coll. v. Conway, 502 N.E.2d 675, 678 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985)).
121. Id. The Fourth Circuit has specifically stated that "a proffer of evidence which
would... establish a valid counterclaim" is a meritorious defense. Augusta Fiberglass, 843 F.2d at
812 (citing Cent. Operating Co. v. Util. Workers of Am., 491 F.2d 245, 252 n.8 (4th Cir. 1974);
Williams v. Blitz, 226 F.2d 463, 464 (4th Cir. 1955) (per curiam)).
122. No. 02AP-237, 2002 WL 31320242 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2002).
123. Id. at *3.
124. Id. at *2-3.
125. Id. at *2. In Oberkonz, 2002 WL 31320242, at *2-*3, and Beal v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., 729 P.2d 318, 325 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986), the courts noted the
discrepancy between the stated actual damages and the amount awarded. It seems reasonable that a
great disparity should weigh heavily on the decision to grant relief from default judgment. In some
cases, the court may make similar assumptions based on the type of case or the nature of the
complaint. WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 85, § 2697, at 162 & n.8 ("[T]he very nature of
plaintiffs complaint gives rise to the belief that cases where persons slip on the floor of a store are
customarily defended with varying degrees of merit." (quoting Trueblood v. Grayson Shops of
Tenn., Inc., 32 F.R.D. 190, 196 (E.D. Va. 1963) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
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in the lives of the parties involved.126 If this issue is presented to a court in
South Carolina, it too should allow such a defense.
IV. RECOMMENDATION

FOR SOUTH CAROLINA

South Carolina courts should hold that a dispute of a damage award is a
meritorious defense in the context of a Rule 60 motion whenever a defendant
raises the issue and makes an adequate showing that a damages hearing would
produce a different result. This would be consistent with the state's current
policy, and adopting such a rule would prevent blurry lines from forming
between defenses as to damages and defenses as to liability.
In McClurg, both the court of appeals majority and Justice Toal's dissent
cited Thompson v. Hammond for the definition of a meritorious defense. 127 A
meritorious defense is one "worthy of a hearing" and "deserving of some
investigation" because of "conflicting or doubtful evidence."' 128 Although this
definition does not contain the "different result" or "different outcome" language
used by Alaska and Texas courts, 129 the effect is the same. In the same way that
a defendant can show that he will produce evidence that could result in a
different outcome, a defendant can demonstrate that there is a dispute "worthy of
hearing,"' 130 short of claiming that he is not liable at all. In fact, Chief Justice
Toal outlined South Carolina's case law on the meritorious defense issue and
came to the conclusion that "the key inquiry is merely whether the materials
submitted to the trial court reflect, in any way, that a contest on the merits might
render different results than the result reached by the default judgment." 13 '

126. Courts have also allowed defenses as to damages only in cases where parties are seeking
to set aside entries of default before default judgments have been entered under FED. R. Civ. P.
55(c). See Esteppe v. Patapsco & Back Rivers R.R. Co., No. Civ. H-00-3040, 2001 WL 604186, at
*4 (D. Md. May 31, 2001) (questioning whether "defenses to the liability issues raised by
defendant.., were meritorious," but granting relief from default based on the proper amount of
damages being in doubt); Wainwright's Vacations, LLC v. Pan Am. Airways Corp., 130 F. Supp.
2d 712, 719 (D. Md. 2001) (finding that defendant "proffered a meritorious defense under Augusta
Fiberglass" where it "raised a viable dispute about the amount it owe[d]" (citing Augusta
Fiberglass,843 F.2d at 812)).
127. McClurg v. Deaton, 395 S.C. 85, 92-93, 716 S.E.2d 887, 891 (2011) (Toal, C.J.,
dissenting) (citing Thompson v. Hammond, 299 S.C. 116, 120, 382 S.E.2d 900, 903 (1989));
McClurg v. Deaton, 380 S.C. 563, 574, 671 S.E.2d 87, 94 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Thompson, 299
S.C. at 120, 382 S.E.2d at 903), aff'd, 395 S.C. 85, 716 S.E.2d 887.
128. Thompson, 299 S.C. at 120, 382 S.E.2d at 903 (quoting Graham v. Town of Loris, 272
S.C. 442, 453, 248 S.E.2d 594, 599 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
129. Cook v. Rowland, 49 P.3d 262, 265 (Alaska 2002) (citing Melendrez v. Bode, 941 P.2d
1254, 1258 (Alaska 1997)); Ferguson & Co. v. Roll, 776 S.W.2d 692, 698 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989)
(citing The Moving Co. v. Whitten, 717 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)).
130. Thompson, 299 S.C. at 120, 382 S.E.2d at 903 (quoting Graham, 272 S.C. at 453, 248
S.E.2d at 599) (internal quotation marks omitted).
131. McClurg, 395 S.C. at 94, 716 S.E.2d at 892 (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
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Damages hearings often are separated from liability hearings, 132 thereby
indicating that a discrepancy in damages is "worthy of hearing." Therefore,
where a defendant presents evidence regarding the appropriate amount of
damages that conflicts with the plaintiff s evidence or casts doubt on the validity
of the remedy sought, the defendant has presented a meritorious defense.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has recognized at least three goals
relating to the meritorious defense requirement. In Edwards, the court declared
that the rule regarding relief from default judgment should be "liberally
construed to see that justice is promoted and to strive for disposition of cases on
their merits." '33 South Carolina courts have cited these two goals as the bases
for finding an abuse of discretion when trial courts have refused to grant relief
from judgments in spite of defendants presenting meritorious defenses, thereby
depriving those defendants of their days in court.
Chief Justice Toal discussed
the third goal in her McClurg dissent, namely, judicial efficiency. 3 5 Because a
reduction in the damage award does "make a difference"136 to the parties
involved, allowing such a defense to justify relief from a default judgment is
consistent with the goals of efficiency, promotion of justice, and having
controversies decided on their merits.
Finally, allowing a defense as to damages only would provide a clearer rule.
Evidence of counterclaims, contributory negligence, or other claims, which may
be viewed as disputes either as to liability or as to damages, will not create grey
areas if damages-only defenses are recognized. The South Carolina Supreme
Court found, in Edwards, that contributory negligence was a valid meritorious
defense. 137 Since contributory negligence is only a partial disclaimer of liability,
it logically flows from this recognition that the South Carolina Supreme Court
would agree with the Ohio Court of Appeals' statement that a "counterclaim
[that] indicates that the proper amount owed to [the plaintiff] is at issue" would
also be a meritorious defense. 138 A rule that a proper showing of any

132. See B. Finberg, Annotation, Defaulting Defendant's Right to Notice and Hearing as to
Determinationof Amount of Damages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586, 588 (1967).
133. Edwards v. Ferguson, 254 S.C. 278, 283, 175 S.E.2d 224, 226 (1970) (citing Gaskins v.
Cal. Ins. Co., 195 S.C. 376, 379-80, 11 S.E.2d 436, 437 (1940)). Edwards refers to section 10-1213
of the 1962 South Carolina Code, which was the current rule regarding relief from default judgment
at the time. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1213 (1962); see also Rochester v. Holiday Magic, Inc., 253 S.C.
147, 149, 169 S.E.2d 387, 388 (1969) ("That code section permits the trial court to relieve a party
from judgment taken through 'mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect,"' (quoting § 10213)).
134. See e.g., Edwards, 254 S.C. at 283, 175 S.E.2d at 226 (citing Gaskins, 195 S.C. at 37980, 11 S.E.2d at 437) (discussing these policy goals and holding that "the trial judge abused his
discretion in failing to vacate the [default] judgment").
135. McClurg, 395 S.C. at 92, 716 S.E.2d at 891 (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
136. Id. (quoting McCall v. Finley, 294 S.C. 1, 4, 362 S.E.2d 26, 28 (Ct. App. 1987)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
137. See Edwards, 254 S.C. at 282, 175 S.E.2d at 225.
138. Mazepa, Inc. v. Krueger, No. 70472, 1997 WL 1090422, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. May 15,
1997).
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counterclaim constitutes a meritorious defense, such as the rule adopted by the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, 139 would be easier to apply and would still
promote the goals of the meritorious defense requirement. If counterclaims and
defenses of contributory negligence are recognized as meritorious, all contests
primarily affecting damages should be recognized as possible meritorious
defenses for the sake of promoting consistency. Furthermore, as Chief Justice
Toal pointed out, recognizing defenses as to damages only would eliminate any
incentive defendants might have to deny wrongdoing where they would
otherwise concede liability. 14° Finally, while recognition of damages-only
defenses as meritorious does affect the finality of the default judgment, Chief
Justice Toal has rightly observed that "a meritorious defense to the amount of
damages awarded must first be accompanied by a showing that the action filed
meets the requirements of Rule 60(b)(1)-(5).''
Because the Rule 60(b)
requirement is unaffected by the meritorious defense rule, 142 allowing defenses
as to damages only will be inapposite to the number of judgments being set
aside.
The more practical question, of course, is what a defendant must present to
the court in order to successfully show a meritorious defense. In McClurg, the
judges who heard the case disagreed as to whether the defense at issue was
properly presented to the circuit court and preserved for appeal. Justice
Pleicones, writing for the supreme court majority, pointed out that the only
mention of the discrepancy between the damages awarded and the settlement
demand was in the "Background" section of a memo supporting New Prime's
Rule 60 motion. 4 3 Justice Pleicones suggested that this mention did not
properly raise a meritorious defense argument.144 He further stated, "it is well
settled [in South Carolina] that the moving party in a Rule 60(b) motion has
the burden of presenting evidence entitling him to relief."1 45 It is clear from
South
Carolina
case
law
that
"bare
assertion[s]"'' 46
and
"unverified ... allegations"1 47 do not meet this standard. Such allegations
must be substantiated by evidence such as affidavits. 148 Further, no

139. See Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, Inc. v. Fodor Contracting Corp., 843 F.2d 808, 812 (4th
Cir. 1988).
140. See McClurg, 395 S.C. at 97, 716 S.E.2d at 893 (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 98, 716 S.E.2d at 894.
142. See id. (citing S.C. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(5)).
143. McClurg, 395 S.C. at 86 n.1, 716 S.E.2d at 887 n.1 (majority opinion).
144. See id.
145. Id. (citing BB&T v. Taylor, 369 S.C. 548, 552, 633 S.E.2d 501, 503 (2006)).
146. McClurg v. Deaton, 380 S.C. 563, 576, 671 S.E.2d 87, 94 (Ct. App. 2008), aft'd, 395
S.C. 85, 716 S.E.2d 887.
147. Bowers v. Bowers, 304 S.C. 65, 68,403 S.E.2d 127, 129 (Ct. App. 1991).
148. See Bowers, 304 S.C. at 68, 403 S.E.2d at 129 ("A motion to open or vacate a judgment
should be supported... by affidavits as to the facts on which the application relies." (citing 49
C.J.S. Judgments § 446 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
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memorandum in support of a motion, 149 settlement offer, 15 or argument made
by an attorney will be considered evidence. 151
Still, Chief Justice Toal and then-Chief Judge Hearn wrote in their dissents
that New Prime had presented a meritorious defense and that, because the circuit
court denied the Rule 60(b) motion, the issue was preserved for appeal. 152 Chief
Justice Toal found that New Prime "raised a meritorious defense to damages
directly within the memoranda supporting their motions to set aside the default
judgment, and supported that claim in an affidavit of a claims specialist with the
Insurer."'

53

She cited Williams v. Watkins, among other cases, for the

proposition that the court of appeals could find the presentation of a meritorious
defense in the record and reverse the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion on that
basis.

54

The majority claimed that Chief Justice Toal's reliance on Williams

was misplaced because in that case, "the Court of Appeals found the meritorious
defense in the party's pleading."155 However,156Chief Justice Toal responded that
she saw no reason to make such a distinction.

Chief Justice Toal also noted that "the majority... expound[ed] the view
that a party must use the magic words, 'meritorious defense,' when arguing that
157
a court may have reached a different result had it heard a case on the merits."

149. McClurg, 395 S.C. 86 n.1, 716 S.E.2d at 887 n.1 (citing Harris Teeter, Inc. v. Moore &
Van Allen, PLLC, 390 S.C. 275, 298, 701 S.E.2d 742, 754 (2010) (Hearn, C.J, concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
150. Id. (citing S.C. R. EvID. 408; Fesmire v. Digh, 385 S.C. 296, 309, 683 S.E.2d 803, 810
(Ct. App. 2009)). Chief Justice Toal, in response to the majority's declaration that a settlement
offer is not evidence, stated:
I do not consider the settlement offer referenced by Petitioners to represent evidence of
what the damages ought to be. However, I believe that the evidence meets the low bar
set for a meritorious defense in that it merely demonstrates the existence of a real
controversy and the probability that a decision on the merits might render a different
result.
Id. at 95 n.6, 716 S.E.2d at 892 n.6 (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
151. Bowers, 304 S.C. at 68, 403 S.E.2d at 129 (citing Gilmore v. Ivey, 290 S.C. 53, 58, 348
S.E.2d 180, 184 (Ct. App. 1986)) ("[T]he trial court properly disregarded the statements of counsel
that he claimed reflected testimony appearing in depositions not otherwise entered into evidence.").
152. See McClurg, 395 S.C. at 89, 716 S.E.2d at 889 (Toal, C.J., dissenting); McClurg v.
Deaton, 380 S.C. 563, 581-82, 671 S.E.2d 87, 97 (Hearn, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), aft'd, 395 S.C. 85, 716 S.E.2d 887. Justice Pleicones asserted that the circuit court judge's
statement that "there has been no showing of a meritorious defense" was an observation, not an
appealable ruling. McClurg, 395 S.C. at 86 n.1, 716 S.E.2d at 887 n.1 (majority opinion) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing S.C. R. EVID. 408; Fesmire, 385 S.C. at 305, 683 S.E.2d at 808).
153. McClurg, 395 S.C. at 95, 716 S.E.2d at 892 (Toal, C.J., dissenting). The affidavit stated
that the affiant had received a $170,000 settlement offer from the McClurgs at one point during
their negotiations. Id.
154. Id. at 94, 716 S.E.2d at 892 (citing Williams v. Watkins, 384 S.C. 319, 326-27, 681
S.E.2d 914, 917-18 (Ct. App. 2009)).
155. Id. at 87 n.2, 716 S.E.2d at 888 n.2 (majority opinion) (citing Williams, 384 S.C. at 32627, 681 S.E. 2d at 918).
156. See id. at 94, 716 S.E.2d at 892 (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 96, 716 S.E.2d at 893.
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While it may be true that South Carolina courts "have never before required such
explicit language," 158 it is also notable that the majority was unclear as to
whether that language was required. 159 After McClurg, defense attorneys would
be wise to specify one or more meritorious defenses in a Rule 60 brief, and to
present affidavits or other evidence specifically to support those defenses.
Once a court determines that a defendant presented evidence of a
meritorious defense, it must then determine whether a meritorious defense only
as to damages allows for the case to be completely reopened upon relief from
default judgment or only for a damages hearing. The supreme court specifically
refused to answer this question after finding that no meritorious defense had
been presented at trial.160 Much of the case law discussed in this Note is silent
on the issue. However, the Texas Court of Appeals explained in Ferguson &
Co. v. Roll, that "any defense to a portion of the damages awarded in the default
judgment" would "requir[e] a new trial on the damage issues."' 16 ' Given that the
goals of the meritorious defense requirement include judicial efficiency and
promotion of justice in cases where the only true contest is the amount of
damages, it would be most just and efficient to try only the damages issues on
the merits. In any case, this decision should be left up to the discretion of the
trial judge because,162as already discussed, these decisions are best made on a
case-by-case basis.
In light of the discretionary nature of the decision to grant relief from default
judgment, many other questions can be answered on a case-by-case basis. For
example, the circuit court could retain discretion to decide how great a
discrepancy between the judgment damages and the damages shown by the
movant's evidence would merit setting aside the judgment. Any problem that
may arise because of insurance companies trying to take advantage of this
development in the law similarly can be handled on a case-by-case basis at the
trial level. However, there is still at least one question that will require a more
defined rule: will a defendant seeking relief from default judgment be given the
opportunity to engage in discovery in order to prove that a lesser amount of
damages would have been appropriate? This question was not raised in McClurg
because plaintiffs counsel had been sending Zurich medical records throughout
the negotiation process. 163 However, in a typical negligence action, the plaintiff
has exclusive access to medical records and proof of damages until that
information is shared with the defendant through the negotiation or discovery

158. Id.
159. See generally id. at 86 n.1, 716 S.E.2d at 887 n.1 (majority opinion) (discussing issue
preservation without specifically stating that the magic words of "meritorious defense" are

required).
160. See id. at 87, 716 S.E.2d at 888.
161. 776 S.W.2d 692, 698 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (citing Folsom Invs., Inc. v. Troutz, 632
S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982)).
162. See supra text accompanying note 85.
163. See McClurg v. Deaton, 380 S.C. 563, 569, 671 S.E.2d 87, 90 (Ct. App. 2008), affd, 395
S.C. 85, 716 S.E.2d 887 (2011).
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processes. If a defendant never had the opportunity to send discovery requests to
the plaintiff or the plaintiff simply did not cooperate with such requests, should
the defendant be given another opportunity to collect this potential evidence? If
such opportunities are available, does that lessen the standard as to what must be
presented in support of a meritorious defense?
It is unlikely that South Carolina courts would lessen the meritorious defense
requirement in favor of granting parties more opportunity to utilize discovery,
nor should they. As already noted, judicial efficiency is an important goal of the
meritorious defense requirement, and granting defendants relief from default
judgments so they may attempt to formulate a defense as to damages, without
requiring that they show any indication of a controversy would, in most cases,
directly oppose that goal. Indeed, an argument to the contrary looks to be
exactly the type of "bare assertion" the court of appeals admonished.164
However, in cases where the defendant can show with circumstantial evidence
that the default judgment entered is likely excessive and that the defendant did
not have a proper opportunity to engage in discovery before the default judgment
was entered, there is no reason the court should not have the discretion to grant
more time for discovery. Granting parties the right to engage in discovery before
a damages hearing would further the goals of promoting justice and disposing of
cases on their merits, without hindering judicial efficiency.
In sum, South Carolina courts should recognize meritorious defenses as to
damages only in the context of a Rule 60 motion if the issue is squarely
presented in the future. Furthermore, decisions regarding whether the case will
be reopened as to issues of liability or only those related to damages, and
whether parties should be allowed to engage in discovery, should be left within
the discretion of the trial court. Because of the discretionary nature of this rule,
there is little risk that parties will succeed in abusing it, and the rule can be used
to further the goals of the meritorious defense requirement: the promotion of
justice, the disposal of cases on their merits, and judicial efficiency.
JessicaL. O'Neill

164. See id. at 576, 671 S.E.2d at 94.
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